GDL

The Myth That Justices Strategically Retire

ISSN: 0362-3319.
Journal from gdlhub / 2012-06-19 11:17:20
Oleh : SAUL BRENNER, University of North Carolina, Charlotte
Dibuat : 2012-06-19, dengan 1 file

Keyword : The Myth That Justices Strategically Retire
Subjek : The Myth That Justices Strategically Retire
Sumber pengambilan dokumen : Internet

Supreme Court scholars have conducted numerous empirical studies regarding the

variables associated with the nomination and confirmation of Supreme Court justices, but

only two empirical scholars (Squire, 1988 and Hagle, 1996) investigated the other side of

the process, i.e., the variables associated with the justices’ decision to leave the Court.

Squire (1988) discovered that severe infirmity and pension eligibility increased the

chances that a justice would retire, while active participation in the Court’s work

decreased the probability. Squire (1988, p. 184) also found that justices in general, as well

as justices with prior elective experience, were no more likely to retire during an

administration of a president of the same party who nominated them than during the administration of a president of a different party. He, therefore, concluded that there is no

evidence that political consideration influences the decision when to retire (1988, p. 185).

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