GDL

Journal from gdlhub / 2017-08-14 11:52:53
Oleh : Roel M.W.J. Beetsma, A. Lans Bovenberg, ELSEVIER (R.Beetsma@berfin.unimaas.nl)
Dibuat : 2010-06-30, dengan 1 file

Keyword : Monetary, union, fiscal, coordination,discipline, policymakers
Url : http://www.elsevier.nl / locate /econbase

With benevolent policymakers and fiscal leadership, monetary unification reduces


inflation, taxes and public spending. These disciplining effects of a monetary union, which


become stronger if the number of participants in the union increases, are likely to raise


welfare. Two types of arrangements are considered for the union’s common central bank


(CCB): making the CCB more conservative and imposing an inflation target on the CCB. In


contrast to the results of Svensson (1997) [Svensson, L.E.O., 1997. Optimal inflation


targets, ‘conservative’ central banks, and linear inflation contracts. American Economic


Review 87, 98–114], an optimally designed, conservative CCB may outperform inflation


targeting. Finally, we find that fiscal coordination offsets the disciplining effects of


monetary unification. Hence, subsidiarity in fiscal policymaking may enhance welfare. 1998 Elsevier Science B.V.

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