GDL

Journal from gdlhub / 2017-08-14 11:55:52
Oleh : R. DAMANIA, Kluwer (ddamania@economics.adelaide.edu.au)
Dibuat : 2010-09-01, dengan 1 file

Keyword : environmental policy, political competition, pollution taxes, rent seeking

This paper investigates the impact of political lobbying on the choice of environmental policy instruments. It is argued that the prevalence of pollution emission standards over more efficient policy instruments may result from rent seeking behaviour. The model further predicts that when an emission standard is used to control pollution, rival political parties have an incentive to set the same standard. There is therefore a convergence of policies. Moreover, it is shown that emission taxes are more likely to be supported and proposed by political parties which represent environmental interest groups. This feature appears to accord with the observed support for environmental taxes by Green parties in Europe, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere

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