GDL

Journal from gdlhub / 2017-08-14 11:52:53
Oleh : Aslam H. Anisa, Michael Benarrochb, Quan Wenc, ELSEVIER (m.benarroch@uwinnipeg.ca (M. Benarroch).)
Dibuat : 2010-06-24, dengan 1 file

Keyword : Persistent, protection, international, exit, game
Url : http://www.elsevier.com/ locate /econbase

This paper examines the strategic behavior of two countries in a duopoly exit game with


declining demand in the export market. We consider whether countries have a strategic


rational to maintain, rather than unilaterally or jointly reduce, their subsidies. Conditions


under which persistent subsidization is justified from a national perspective are derived. By


maintaining subsidies one country can gain a strategic advantage by forcing its rival to exit


earlier. An outcome where only one country applies the subsidy is not attainable. Free trade


is less likely to occur close to the end of the game.

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